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Abstract
Technological change was unskilled-labor-biased during the early Industrial Revolution,
but is skill-biased today. This is not embedded in extant uniﬁed growth models. We
develop a model which can endogenously account for these facts, where factor bias
reﬂects proﬁt-maximizing decisions by innovators. Endowments dictate that the early
Industrial Revolution be unskilled-labor-biased. Increasing basic knowledge causes a
growth takeo , an income-led demand for fewer educated children, and the transition to
skill-biased technological change. The simulated model tracks British industrialization
in the 18th and 19th centuries and generates a demographic transition without relying
on either rising skill premia or exogenous educational supply shocks.
Keywords: endogenous growth, demography, uniﬁed growth theory.
JEL Codes: O31, O33, J13, J24, N10.On March 11, 1811, several hundred framework knitters gathered in the Nottingham mar-
ketplace, not far from Sherwood Forest, to protest their working conditions. Having been
dispersed by the constabulary and a troop of Dragoons, they reassembled that evening in
nearby Arnold, and broke some 60 stocking frames. On November 10 of the same year,
another Arnold mob gathered in Bulwell Forest, under the command of someone styling
himself “Ned Lud,” and the rapidly growing Luddite movement would su er its ﬁrst fatality
that night when John Westley was shot dead during an attack on the premises of Edward
Hollingsworth, a local hosier.
Today, the term Luddite often refers to opponents of technological progress for its own
sake. At the time, however, Captain Ludd’s followers were engaged in what Hobsbawm
(1952, p. 59) has termed “collective bargaining by riot.” “In none of these cases ...was
there any question of hostility to machines as such. Wrecking was simply a technique of
trade unionism” (ibid.) on the part of skilled textile workers whose living standards were
being eroded by new machinery. This new machinery was making it possible for employers
not just to produce cloth more e ciently, but to use cheaper unskilled workers, women, and
even children, in the place of highly paid artisans. Technological change during the early
Industrial Revolution hurt skilled workers, and as we can see from Figure 1, skill premia fell
(Clark 2007; Katz and Autor 1999). Not surprisingly, skilled workers objected to this.
The emergence of Luddism occurred during what Galor and Weil (2000) have termed
the “post-Malthusian regime.” During this phase of British economic history, technological
change was enabling the economy to slowly escape the Malthusian trap. However, living
standards only rose slowly during this period, as population grew at an accelerating rate.
But by the late 19th century, technological change was accelerating and living standards
were growing more rapidly (Figure 2). Much of this acceleration was due to a dramatic
and well-documented demographic transition, whereby fertility rates fell and educational
standards rose (Figure 3). Many new technologies were now beginning to emerge which
were skill-using rather than skill-saving, for example in modern chemical and metallurgical
industries. But as Figure 1 shows, such a shift did not coincide with rising skill premia, since
if anything they continued to fall.
All these pieces of historical evidence beg a uniﬁed explanation (Voth 2003). To theorists
used to considering household fertility choices within a quantity-quality trade-o  framework
(Becker and Lewis 1973; Becker and Tomes 1976), the fact that the demographic transition,
and the switch to what Galor and Weil call “modern economic growth,” occurred during a
period within which skill premia were falling poses a problem. If the skill premium is the
crucial relative price which households take into account when deciding how many children to
have, and how well to educate them, then ceteris paribus falling skill premia should have led
1Figure 1: English Skill Premium, 1715–1915
The ﬁgure shows the ratio of the skilled to the unskilled wage in England in the 18th and 19th
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to rising fertility rates and falling educational levels. A logical response to this dilemma is to
argue that other things were not in fact equal. For example, one could argue, as does Galor
(2005, pp. 255–56), that technological change was driving up the skill premium during the
transition to modern economic growth, thus bringing about the demographic transition, but
that “the sizable increase in schooling that took place in the 19th century and in particular
the introduction of public education that lowered the cost of education (e.g., The Education
Act of 1870), generated (a) signiﬁcant increase in the supply of educated workers that may
have prevented a rise in the return to education.”
In this paper, we adopt a di erent approach, generating a demographic transition in the
context of a model in which technological change is indeed initially unskilled-labor-biased, as
was in fact the case; in which skill premia fall without subsequently rising, again as was the
2Figure 2: Annual Growth Rates of GDP per Capita and Population in Western Europe:
1500–2000
The ﬁgure shows the permanent acceleration in growth rates and the temporary boom in
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case; and in which household fertility choices do indeed reﬂect quantity-quality trade-o s.
We do this without having to appeal to exogenous educational supply shocks, or indeed to
exogenous shocks of any kind. However, in order to accomplish these objectives we need
to go beyond the current so-called “uniﬁed growth theory” literature (e.g., Galor and Weil
2000; Jones 2001; Hansen and Prescott 2002; Lucas 2002; Weisdorf 2004) in several respects.
Most obviously, we need to incorporate two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, so
that we can track their relative earnings over time. Second, we need to allow for factor-
biased technological change. Third, and most importantly, we need to allow the direction of
factor bias to di er at di erent points in time, since we want to explain why the Industrial
Revolution was initially so bad for skilled workers, rather than simply assume this was the
3Figure 3: Fertility and Schooling in Four Advanced Countries
The ﬁgures show two important correlates of the Industrial Revolution: fertility decreased (the
Demographic Transition) and education increased. However, the transtions did not occur until
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5case. Similarly, we want to explain why, by the end of the 19th century, new technologies
that were skill-using were being invented, rather than just assume this was happening. We
are thus going to have to explicitly model the choices facing would-be innovators. If the
direction of technological change di ered over time, this presumably reﬂected the di erent
incentives facing these inventors.
In this paper, we thus delve into the microeconomics of technological change to a greater
extent than previous uniﬁed growth theory papers, which have tended to model technological
change in a reduced form manner as a function of scale a ects (cf. Romer 1990, Kremer
1993) and/or human capital endowments. We propose a fully-speciﬁed research and devel-
opment model driving technological change, which is appropriate for this period since Allen
(2006) has recently pointed out that British ﬁrms were investing signiﬁcant resources in the
search for technological breakthroughs during the Industrial Revolution. Building on the
foundations of the benchmark Galor-Weil (2000) and Galor-Mountford (2008) models, we
thus make several key changes to previous speciﬁcations.
The ﬁrst key feature of our model, and the paper’s main contribution, is that it en-
dogenizes the direction of technological change. There are two ways to produce output,
using either a low-skill technique (based on raw labor L) or a high-skill technique (based
on educated labor or human capital H). For simplicity, these techniques are each linear in
their sole input, and are characterized by their own, endogenous, productivity coe cients or
technology levels.
Research by ﬁrms, which is patentable or otherwise excludable in the short run, can raise
these technology levels and generate short-run monopoly proﬁts. In the spirit of Acemoglu
(1998), we allow potential innovators to look at the supply of skilled and unskilled labor
in the workforce, and tailor their research e orts accordingly. The direction as well as the
pace of technological change thus depends on demography. At the same time, demography
is explicitly modeled as depending on technology, as is common in the literature (e.g., Galor
and Weil 2000). Households decide the quality and quantity of their children (that is, the
future supply of L and H) based directly on anticipated future wages, and thus (indirectly)
on recent technological developments. As such the model allows for the co-evolution of both
factors and technologies.
The second key feature of our approach is that we distinguish between two di erent types
of technological progress: basic knowledge (B) and applied knowledge (A). In our model, the
former grows according to the level of human capital in the economy and is a public good;
the latter describes ﬁrms’ techniques, which are subject (for a time) to private property
rights, generate private proﬁts, and hence create incentives for research. In our model, A
is driven by research which generates beneﬁts (increases in A) but also has costs (that are
6decreasing in B); thus basic knowledge drives the development of applied knowledge.
This distinction between basic and applied knowledge is inspired by Mokyr (2002, 2005a),
who distinguishes between two knowledge types: the “propositional” episteme (“what”) and
the “prescriptive” techne (“how”). An addition to the former is for Mokyr a discovery, and
an addition to the latter an invention. These categories can be thought of as close parallels
to our B-knowledge (which we call “Baconian” knowledge) and A-knowledge (our sector-
speciﬁc productivity levels, or TFP). We propose the term Baconian knowledge to honor
Francis Bacon, since if Mokyr (2002, p. 41) is correct, then “the amazing fact remains that
by and large the economic history of the Western world was dominated by materializing
his ideals.” Our model can provide a rationale for one of Mokyr’s key claims, namely that
“the true key to the timing of the Industrial Revolution has to be sought in the scientiﬁc
revolution of the seventeenth century and the enlightenment movement of the eighteenth
century” (p. 29). As will be seen, basic knowledge has to advance in our model for some
time before applied knowledge starts to improve. This helps the model match reality: we ﬁnd
that Baconian knowledge B can increase continuously, but applied knowledge or productivity
A only starts to rise in a discontinuous manner once B passes some threshold.
The third key feature of our model is that it embodies a fairly standard demographic
mechanism, in which parents have to trade o  between maximizing current household con-
sumption and the future skilled income generated by their children. We get the standard
result that, ceteris paribus, a rising skill premium implies rising educational levels and falling
fertility levels, while a falling skill premium implies the reverse. However, we further assume
that rising wages makes education more a ordable for households. Thus our model suggests
that robust technological growth during the late 19th century fostered the dramatic rise in
education and fall in fertility even with the low skill premia of the time. A truly uniﬁed
theory of industrialization should be able to capture all these trends; extant uniﬁed theories
fall short in some important respects.
The next section of the paper presents the key aspects of the model, which endogenizes
both technologies and demography. We then simulate this model to show how the theory
can track the key features of the industrialization of Western Europe during the 18th and
19th centuries.
1 The Model
In this section we build a theoretical version of an industrializing economy in successive steps,
keeping the points enumerated in the introduction ﬁrmly in mind. Section 1.1 goes over
the production function and technologies. Here we develop a method for endogenizing the
7scope and direction of technical change, keeping endowments ﬁxed. Section 1.2 then merges
the model with an overlapping generations framework in order to endogenize demographic
variables. These two parts form an integrated dynamic model which we use to analyze the
industrialization of England during the 18th and 19th centuries.
1.1 Technology and Production
We begin by illustrating the static general equilibrium of a hypothetical economy. The
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where Al and Ah are technology terms, L is unskilled labor, H is skilled labor, and   is
the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediate inputs. Heuristically, one might
think of the ﬁnal good Y as being “GDP” which is simply aggregated up from the two
intermediates.
By construction, Al is L-augmenting and Ah is H-augmenting. We will assume throughout
the paper that these intermediates are grossly substitutable, and thus assume that   > 1.1
With this assumption of substitutability, a technology that augments a particular factor is
also biased towards that factor. Thus we will call Al unskilled-labor-biased technology, and
Ah skill-biased technology.
Economic outcomes heavily depend on which sectors enjoy superior productivity perfor-
mance. Some authors use loaded terms such as “modern” and “traditional” to label the
fast and slow growing sectors, at least in models where sectors are associated with types of
goods (e.g., manufacturing and agriculture). We employ neutral language, since we contend
that growth can emanate from di erent sectors at di erent times, where ‘sectors’ in our
model are set up to reﬂect factor biases in technology. We argue that the unskilled-intensive
sector was the leading sector during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, while the
skilled-intensive sector signiﬁcantly modernized only from the mid-1800s onwards.
We assume that markets for both the ﬁnal good and the factors of production are per-
fectly competitive. Thus, prices are equal to unit costs, and factors are paid their marginal
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From the above we can see that, so long as   > 1, and holding ﬁxed the supply of factors
H and L, a rise (fall) in Ah relative to Al implies a rise (fall) in the demand for skilled
labor relative to unskilled labor, and in our model this will generate a rise (fall) in the skill
premium, all else equal. Similarly, holding Ah and Al constant, a rise (fall) in H/L will
lead to a fall (rise) in the skill premium, all else equal. Later, however, we will see how
supplies of factors change endogenously in the long run in response to the skill premium,
and how changes in the technology parameters Ah and Al depend, among other things, on
factor supplies and wage rates.
In order to endogenize the evolution of factor-speciﬁc technology levels Al and Ah, we
model technological development as improvements in the quality of machines, as in Acemoglu
(1998). Speciﬁcally, we assume that researchers expend resources to improve the quality of a
machine, and receive some positive proﬁts (due to patents or ﬁrst-mover advantage) from the
sale of these new machines for only one time period.2 We then deﬁne the productivity levels
Al and Ah to be amalgamations of quality-adjusted machines that augment either unskilled
labor, or skilled labor, but not both.
In our model, costly innovation will be undertaken to improve some machine j (designed
to be employed either by skilled or unskilled labor), get the blueprints for this newly im-
proved machine, use these blueprints to produce the machine, and sell these machines to the
producers of the intermediate good. After one period, however, new researchers can enter
the market, and we ﬁnd that newer, better machines will drive out the older designs. In
this fashion we simplify the process of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1934, Aghion and
Howitt 1992), where successful researchers along the quality dimension tend to eliminate the
monopoly rentals of their predecessors.
Intermediate Goods Production
Let us now make technology levels explicit functions of these quality-adjusted machines. Al
and Ah at time t are deﬁned as the following:
2Conceptually one could assume either that patent rights to innovation last only one time period, or
equivalently that it takes one time period to reverse engineer the development of a new machine. In any
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where 0 <   < 1. Ml are machines that are strictly employed by unskilled workers, while
Mh are machines that are strictly employed by skilled workers. qz(j) is the highest quality of
machine j of type z. Note that these technological coe cients may thus be interpreted simply
as functions of di erent types of capital per di erent types of workers; the capital however in
this case is specialized and quality-adjusted. The speciﬁcations here imply constant returns
to scale in the production of the skilled- and unskilled-intensive intermediate goods.
In the end, we care less about micro di erences in machine qualities than about macro
e ects on total factor productivity. To draw conclusions about the latter we note that our
problem is symmetric at the sector level, implying that aggregation is straightforward. In
particular, machines along the (0,1) continuum will on average be of symmetric quality, as
inventors will be indi erent as to which particular machines along the continuum they will
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where Qk simply denotes the uniform and symmetric quality of all machines used in sector
k   {l,h}.
Increases in this index directly increase the total factor productivity of the sector. We
also assume that machines last one period, and then depreciate completely.
Our modeling approach reﬂects the idea that di erent production techniques can be im-
plemented only by particular factors. For example, by way of initial conditions, preindustrial
textile production needed highly skilled labor such as spinners and weavers. Similarly, other
preindustrial manufactures relied on their own skilled artisans of various sorts. But changes
followed: implementing the technologies of the Industrial Revolution (in textile production,
iron smelting and reﬁning, mining and agriculture) required large labor forces with little to
no specialized training, and happy, highly-valued skilled craftsmen became angry, machine-
breaking Luddites. These changes are proxied here as increases in Al.
Much later, fortunes changed: the techniques developed in the latter half of the 19th
century (for example in chemicals, electrical industries and services) raised the demand for a
10new labor force with highly specialized skills (Mokyr 1999). According to Goldin and Katz
(2008), in the early 20th century (or from as early as the 1890s onwards, in certain sectors)
American manufacturers began to adopt continuous-process or batch production methods,
associated with new electricity- and capital-intensive technologies. These new technologies
increased the relative demand for skilled workers, who were required to operate the new
machinery, and ceteris paribus raised the return to skills. These changes are proxied here as
increases in Ah.
Returning to the model, let us consider a representative ﬁrm that competitively produces
the unskilled intermediate. (For brevity, much of what follows will deal with only this L-
using unskilled sector. Analogous results hold for the H-using skilled sector.) The ﬁrm’s
maximization problem is stated as
max
{L,Ml(j)}
pl · AlL  
  1
0
p(j)Ml(j)dj   wlL, (9)
where pl is the price of the unskilled-intensive intermediate good, and p(j) is the price of
machine Ml(j) faced by all producers of the intermediate. Hence the ﬁrm chooses an amount
of unskilled labor to hire and amounts of complementary machines to employ, taking the
price of its output, the price of machines, and the price of raw labor as given.
From the ﬁrst order condition on L we have
pl Al = wl. (10)
Solving for the price of the intermediate we have pl =
wl
 Al. From the ﬁrst order condition on








The Gains from Innovation
Innovation in a sector takes the form of an improvement in the quality of a machine by a
certain multiple. Innovators expend resources up front to develop machine-blueprints, which
they use to produce and sell a better-quality machine (all in the same time period). Assume
that innovation is deterministic; that is, individuals who decide to research will improve the
quality of a machine with a probability of one. We assume that there is a ‘quality ladder’
with discretely-spaced rungs. If innovation in sector j occurs, the quality of machine j will
deterministically rise to  Ql, where   > 1 denotes the factor by which machine quality can
rise. If on the other hand innovation does not occur, the quality of machine j remains at
11Ql. If someone innovates, they have sole access to the blueprint for one period; after that
the blueprint is public.
Once the researcher spends the resources necessary to improve the quality of machine j,
she becomes the sole producer of this machine, and charges whatever price (call it p(j)) she
sees ﬁt. Thus she receives total revenue of p(j)Ml(j). Here we must make the distinction
between the cost of producing a machine, and the cost of inventing a machine. We discuss
the costs of innovation in the next sub-section. Here, we assume that the marginal cost
of producing a machine is proportional to its quality, so that better machines are more
expensive to make—a form of diminishing returns. Indeed, we can normalize this cost, so
that total costs are simply QlMl(j).
Thus the producer of a new unskilled-using machine will wish to set the price p(j) in
order to maximize Vl(j) = p(j)Ml(j)   QlMl(j), where Vl(j) is the value of owning the
rights to the new blueprints of machine j at that moment in time. The question for us is
what this price will be. Note that it will not be possible for the owner to charge the full
monopoly markup over marginal cost unless the quality increase   is very large. This is
because all machines in sector j are perfect substitutes (they are simply weighted by their
respective qualities); by charging a lower price, producers of older lower-quality machines
could compete with producers of newer higher-quality machines.
We thus assume that producers of new machines engage in Bertrand price competition,
in the spirit of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003). In this
case the innovator and quality leader uses a limit-pricing strategy, setting a price that is
su ciently below the monopoly price so as to make it just barely unproﬁtable for the next
best quality to be produced.
This limit pricing strategy maximizes Vl and ensures that all older machine designs are
eliminated from current production. The Appendix describes how we solve for this price;
our solution yields
p(j) = plimit =  
1
1  Ql. (12)
Note that this price is higher than the marginal cost of producing new machines, and so
there is always a positive value of owning the blueprint to a new machine. Plugging this



























12The Costs of Innovation
Before an innovator can build a new machine, she must spend resources on R&D to ﬁrst get
the blueprints. Let us denote these costs as cl (for a new unskilled-labor using machine).
The resource costs of research will evolve due to changing economic circumstances. Specif-
ically, the “price” of a successful invention should depend on things like how complicated
the invention is and how “deep” general knowledge is. To capture some of these ideas, let us
assume that the resource costs of research to improve machine j in the unskilled-intensive
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We include   > 1 as a “ﬁshing-out” parameter—the greater is the complexity of existing
machines, the greater is the di culty of improving upon them (see Jones 1998 on ﬁshing
out). The variable B is our measure of current general knowledge that we label Baconian
knowledge. The general assumptions in each sector are that research is more costly the higher
is the quality of machine one aspires to invent (another sort of diminishing returns), and the
lower is the stock of general knowledge.
Growth of Baconian Knowledge
Baconian knowledge B can thus inﬂuence the level of technology A. But what are the
plausible dynamics of B?
We allow general knowledge to grow throughout human history, irrespective of living
standards and independent of the applied knowledge embedded in actual technology levels.
According to Mokyr (2005b, pp. 291–2), Bacon regarded “knowledge as subject to constant
growth, as an entity that continuously expands and adds to itself.” Accordingly, we assume
that the growth in basic knowledge depends on the existing stock. Furthermore, we assume
that Baconian knowledge grows according to how much skilled labor exists in the economy;3
speciﬁcally, we assume the simple form:
 Bt+1 = Ht · Bt. (17)
Thus we assume that increases in general knowledge (unlike increases in applied knowl-
edge) do not arise from any proﬁt motive, but are rather the fortuitous by-product of the
3Galor and Mountford (2008) make a rather similar assumption.
13existence of a stock of skilled workers, as well as of accumulated stocks of Baconian knowl-
edge. But in our model, as we shall see, a skilled worker is just an educated worker, so it is
here that the link between productivity growth and human capital is made explicit.
Thus we have a mechanism by which the growth in general knowledge (B) can inﬂuence
the subsequent development of applied knowledge (Al and Ah). Our functional forms (15)
and (16) assume that low Baconian knowledge produces relatively large costs to machine
improvement, while high Baconian knowledge generates low costs to machine improvement.
In our model, B will never fall since (17) ensures that changes in B are nonnegative. Hence,
the general knowledge set always expands. This is not a historically trivial assumption,
although it is accurate for the episode under scrutiny: Mokyr (2005b, 338–9) comments on
the fact that knowledge had been lost after previous “e orescences” (Goldstone 2002) in
China and Classical Antiquity, and states that “The central fact of modern economic growth
is the ultimate irreversibility of the accumulation of useful knowledge paired with ever-falling
access costs.”
Modeling the Beginnings of Industrialization
Turning to the decision to innovate in the ﬁrst place, we assume that any individual can spend
resources on research to develop and build machines with one quality-step improvement. Of
course they will innovate only if it is proﬁtable to do so. Speciﬁcally, if  i = Vi   ci   0,
research activity for i-type machines occurs, otherwise it does not. That is,
Ql,t =
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As these expressions make clear, applied innovations will not be proﬁtable until Baconian
knowledge reaches a certain critical threshold where beneﬁts exceed costs. The natural world
needs to be su ciently intelligible before society can begin to master it (Mokyr 2002). Thus
our model embodies the idea that growth in general Baconian knowledge is a necessary but
not su cient condition for output growth.
Finally, which type of applied innovations happen ﬁrst? It turns out that due to a “market
size” e ect, the sector that innovates ﬁrst will be the one using the abundant factor, since
it is there that there is the greatest potential demand for new machines. We can state the
14following proposition:
Proposition 1. If Ql = Qh and L > H, initial technological growth will be unskilled-labor
biased if and only if   > 1.
Proof. Given Ql = Qh, the costs of innovation are the same for skilled and unskilled-labor-
using machines, and are falling at the same rate. Thus in order to illustrate that initial
growth will be unskill-intensive, we must demonstrate that initial conditions are such that
Vl > Vh.
First, note that we can plug the limit price from (12) into our machine demand equation
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We then can plug these expressions into our value expressions (13) and (14). After































Computing the ratio of these last two expressions, we see that our condition for innovation
to occur ﬁrst in the L sector is
Vh < Vl   
Vh
Vl







given the maintained assumption that Ql = Qh.
From this we can see that the relative gains for the innovator are larger when the factor
capable of using the innovation is large (the so-called “market-size” e ect) and when the price
of the factor is large (the so-called “price” e ect). To get everything in terms of relative
factor supplies, we can use (4) and our productivity expressions (20) and (21), to get a new
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15Finally, by plugging this relative wage into the above inequality, and again using the fact
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< 1.
Given that L/H > 1, this can only hold if the exponent is negative, which (since 0 <   < 1)
is true only when   > 1.
In other words, provided that labor-types are grossly substitutable, the initial stages of
industrialization had to be unskilled-labor-intensive simply because there were so many more
unskilled laborers in the workforce than skilled laborers. So, to grossly simplify the history of
innovation, we maintain that for most of human existence the inequalities  l < 0 and  h < 0
held strictly. Once  l   0, industrialization could occur. Once both  l   0 and  h   0,
robust modern economic growth could occur. As we will suggest below, this sequence was
precisely how we believe history played out.
1.2 Endogenous Demography
We adopt a variant of a fairly standard overlapping generations model of demography suited
to uniﬁed growth theory (cf. Galor and Weil 2000).
In a very simpliﬁed speciﬁcation, we assume that ‘adult’ agents maximize their utility,
which depends both on their current household consumption and on their children’s expected
future income. In an abstraction of family life, we assume that individuals begin life naturally
as unskilled workers, accumulate human capital, and then become skilled workers as adults.
Consequently the skilled and unskilled are divided into two distinct age groups. That is, an
agent evolves naturally from a ‘young’ unskilled worker into an ‘adult’ skilled worker; thus
his welfare will be a ected by both types of wages.
Only ‘adults’ are allowed to make any decisions regarding demography. Speciﬁcally, the
representative household is run by an adult who decides two things: how many children to
have (denoted nt) and the level of education each child is to receive (denoted et). The number
of children must be nonnegative and to keep things simple all households are single-parent,
with n = 1 being the replacement level of fertility. The education level is constrained to the
unit interval and is the fraction of time the adult devotes to educating the young.
Our modeling of demography is as follows. An individual born at time t spends fraction
et of her time in school (something chosen by her parent), while spending the rest of her
time as an unskilled laborer. At t + 1, the individual (who is by this time a mature adult)
16works strictly as a skilled laborer, using whatever human capital she had accumulated as a
child.
The Adult Household Planner
Allowing for the costs of child-rearing, we assume that the household consumes all the income
that the family members have generated. At time t there are Lt 1 adults, each of whom
is an individual household planner. These planners wish to maximize the sum of current
household consumption and the future skilled income generated by their children. That is,
the representative agent born at time t 1, who is now an adult at time t, faces the problem







where ct denotes current consumption per household, nt denotes the fertility rate, and
Ht+1/Lt is the average future level of human capital “bequested” by parents to each of
their children. Each household thus wishes to maximize both its own level of consumption
and the future skilled income to be earned by the children of that household. Note that we
here assume that agents base their expectations of future wages wh,t+1 on current wages wh,t
in myopic fashion.4
We now must specify more precisely how household consumption, population, and human
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t   xntet, (26)
Lt = ntLt 1, (27)
Ht+1 = (etLt)
k = (etntLt 1)
k , (28)
where   > 0, x > 0, µ > 1 and 0 < k < 1. The ﬁrst term in (26) is the income generated
by the parent (this is total skilled income generated at time t, wh,tHt, divided by the total
number of adults Lt 1). The second term in (26) is the unskilled income generated by the
children (each child spends 1   e of their childhood as an unskilled worker). Thus we see
that when children are not being educated for a fraction of time 1   e, they increase the
family’s unskilled income, but this will reduce their own future skilled income because they
will receive a lower endowment of H.
4An arguably less realistic rational expectations approach, where households anticipate wages in the future
based on the model, would complicate the algebra, but simulations show that the di erence this makes is so
small that it would not alter our results in any meaningful way.
17The ﬁnal two terms in (26) are the overall costs of child-rearing. Note that while having
more children involves an opportunity cost of time (since these costs depend on the skilled
wages of the parent), each unit of education per child involves a resource cost (of some
amount x).
The ﬁrst of these e ects is now totally standard, and incorporates the costs of producing
raw unskilled o spring as a function of their number. Having more children typically requires
parents to spend more time on child rearing. This explains the opportunity cost term wh n
µ
t ,
which is increasing in n, although 0 < µ < 1 allows for some economies of scale.
The second of these e ects reﬂects the costs of educating the o spring to make them
more skilled. It is also increasing in the number of children. That property appears, for
example, in Galor and Mountford (2008), where, under a discrete choice, unskilled or skilled
o spring may be created at exogenously ﬁxed time costs  u and  s, where the latter exceeds
the former (generating an exogenous, ﬁxed skill premium on the supply side when both types
of o spring are present).
Our set up is slightly di erent in that we allow for a continuum of educational investments
e which a ect the ultimate human capital level of the n children. We think of this as a
resource cost rather than a time cost (e.g., books and other educational overhead), and this
cost is allowed to rise in proportion to the amount of educational services supplied. This
explains the resource cost term xntet. We treat x as an exogenous unit cost. In principle x
might shift in response to changes in school productivity, input costs, or public policies that
subsidize the cost of education.
The last of these forces played an increasing role in Britain toward the end of the nine-
teenth century, mostly after our period of interest, and that story and its political economy
origins are discussed in Galor and Moav (2006). Although we do not examine the e ects of
shifts in x in this paper, the presence of this term generates sharp income e ects which are
central to our account of the growth process, as for a given level of x, growth implies increased
a ordability of education. The income-elasticity of education is a potentially important ef-
fect in this period, despite its omission from some theories. As noted by Mitch (1992, 82),
inﬂuential historians such as Roger Schoﬁeld (1973) and E. G. West (1975), who might not
agree on broader questions, thought rising incomes were important causally, allowing poorer
families (with no access to credit) to be able to a ord human capital investments. In his own
empirical analysis, Mitch (1992, 84–86) ﬁnds mixed support for the hypothesis.5 Allowing x
5Strong results on schooling (parental income elasticities near 1) emerge from raw data, but not for
regressions that include “regional” dummies (e.g., village or county), suggesting that these e ects are most
clearly visible across locales. In regressions of child literacy on income, regressions for speciﬁc towns (London,
Macclesﬁeld, Hanley) were unable to detect within-town variation (p. 86). But a national sample using
occupational proxies for wages found an parental income elasticity of literacy of 0.72. This last result could
18to fall would only enhance our story further by encourage an even stronger switch towards
skill-biased growth. For the purposes of being conservative, and since this e ect has been
explored elsewhere, we keep x constant.
Notice that we assume a particular functional form for human capital, where the term etLt
represents the total educational input of the economy. Also notice that increases in fertility
rates will immediately translate into increased levels of unskilled labor, while increases in
education will eventually translate into increased levels of skilled labor next period. Thus
given our discussion above, wage changes will immediately change the overall population
level, and will eventually change the level of human capital in the economy. Given (26) -
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subject to: nt   0, and 0 < et   1 .
The individual born at t   1 will choose a pair of {nt,et} that maximizes (25), taking
perceived wages as given.
From (29), the ﬁrst-order condition for the number of children is:




µ 1 + xet. (30)
The left-hand side illustrates the marginal beneﬁt of an additional child, while the right-
hand side denotes the marginal cost. At the optimum, the gains from an extra unskilled
worker in the family and more skilled income for children in the future precisely o sets the
opportunity and resource costs resulting from additional child-rearing.




= (wl,t + x)nt. (31)
Again the left-hand side is the marginal beneﬁt and the right-hand side is the marginal cost,
be undermined by the inclusion of parental literacy, but the latter is of course highly collinear with income.
Mitch also found that income elasticities were falling as incomes rose, suggesting the possibility of threshold
e ects. In accounts by contemporaries, poor parents themselves were found to cite poverty as the main
reason they did not send their kids to school, although their upper-class neighbors were apt to disagree. Go
(2008) ﬁnds a strong correlation between father’s wealth and school attendance by the child in 1850; this
correlation disappears in later years after the introduction of free public schools.
19this time of an extra unit of education per child. At the optimum, the gains received from
more skilled income by children o set the foregone unskilled-labor income and the extra
resource cost associated with an extra educational unit for all children at t.
2 A Tale of Two Revolutions
Sections 1.1 and 1.2 summarize the long-run co-evolution of factors and technologies in the
model. Once innovation occurs and levels of Ql and Qh are determined, the complete general
equilibrium can be characterized by simultaneously solving (2), (3), (20), (21), (27), (28),
(30) and (31) for wages, productivity-levels, fertility, education, and factors.
We are now ready to see how well our model can account for what happened in Eng-
land (and other northwestern European economies) during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
2.1 The Industrial Revolution
An economy before its launch into the Industrial Revolution may be described by the one
in section 1.1, with technological coe cients Al and Ah constant. Here wages are ﬁxed, and
thus the levels of raw labor and human capital remain ﬁxed as well. Both output and output
per capita remain stagnant.
If we assume that the evolution of technological coe cients Al and Ah are described
by the relationships in section 1.1, then the economy must wait until Baconian knowledge
grows to a su cient level before applied innovation becomes possible. Further, technological
growth will initially be unskilled-labor biased (that is, there is growth in Al) so long as
it becomes proﬁtable to improve machines used in the unskilled sector before it becomes
proﬁtable to improve machines used in the skilled sector
Thus if the economy begins such that Al = Ah (as we maintain in the simulations),
initial technological growth will be unskilled labor biased so long as there is relatively more
unskilled labor than skilled labor in the economy, which was surely the case in the eighteenth
century (by Proposition 1).
Furthermore, these technological developments change the wage structure, and by impli-
cation the evolution of factor endowments. The growth of Al lowers the skill premium, as
can be seen in our expression (4), increasing the future ratio of unskilled wages to skilled
wages. As wl rises faster than wh, the marginal gains of having more children (the left hand
side of equation 30) rise faster than the marginal costs (the right hand side of 30); households
respond by raising fertility. This is a major emphasis of our model and this paper. Unlike
20all extant “uniﬁed” models of the Industrial Revolution and Modern Economic Growth, we
try to take the Luddites seriously: population boomed, and skilled labor’s relative earnings
were initially hurt by the Industrial Revolution, a historical fact that many current theories
fail to explain.
This story of unbalanced growth in early industrialization seems consistent with history.
Well-known studies such as Atack (1987) and Sokolo  (1984) describe the transition of the
American economy from reliance on highly-skilled artisans to the widespread mechanization
of factories. This paper further argues that the boom in fertility that the industrializing areas
experienced was both the cause and consequence of these technological revolutions arising,
in the British case, in the late 1700s and early 1800s. According to Folbre (1994), the
development of industry in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries led to changes
in family and household strategies. The early pattern of rural and urban industrialization
in this period meant that children could be employed in factories at quite a young age.
The implication is that children became an asset, whose labor could be used by parents to
contribute income to the household. In English textile factories in 1835, for example, 63%
of the work force consisted of children aged 8-12 and women (Nardinelli 1990). This is not
to say that attitudes toward children were vastly di erent in England then compared with
now; rather economic incentives were vastly di erent then compared with now (Horrell and
Humphries 1995). As a result of these conditions, fertility rates increased during the period
of early industrialization.
While our approach may help explain the population growth that coincided with the
initial stages of the Industrial Revolution,6 we are still faced with the challenge of explaining
the demographic transition that followed it.
2.2 The Demographic Transition
Figure 3 documented rising education and falling fertility rates in four advanced countries, a
shift which was replicated in many rich countries at the time. Part of our argument is that
biases inherent in technological innovation fostered this reversal. As Baconian knowledge
rose further and skill-biased production grew in importance, the labor of children became
less important as a source of family income, and this was reﬂected in economic behavior. It
is true that legislation limited the employment possibilities for children (Folbre 1994), and
introduced compulsory education. However,the underlying economic incentives were leading
in the same direction.
6Of course there are a host of other explanations, including falling death rates related to health improve-
ments, and the passage of various Poor Laws. Naturally we are abstracting from these possibilities without
dismissing them as inconsequential.
21The incentives for households to reverse fertility trends and dramatically expand edu-
cation come about through changes in wages. As evident from (30) and (31), households
will want to invest in greater education and limit fertility not only when skilled wages rise
relative to unskilled wages (since educated children provide a greater relative return than
unskilled children), but also when overall wages rise (since the resource costs of education
grow less onerous with wage growth). From (31) we see that while the beneﬁts of education
rise with both types of wages (since ct rises with both), the costs of education rise only with
wl (which captures the foregone unskilled income necessary for educational investments).
Modest wage growth and falling relative returns to skilled labor, characteristic of early
industrialization, allows fertility to rise while keeping education growth modest. But once
the fall in skill premia slows down and overall wages start to rapidly rise, the beneﬁts of
education begin to dramatically outweigh the costs, and the transition in household demand
from child quantity to child quality is truly launched.7
2.3 Simulations
How well does the model track these general historical trends? To answer this we numerically
simulate the model.
For each time period, we solve the model as follows:
1) Baconian knowledge grows according to (17).
2) Based on this new level of Baconian knowledge, if  l > 0, Ql rises by a factor of  ; if
not Ql remains the same. Similarly, if  h > 0, Qh rises by a factor of  ; if not Qh remains
the same.
3) Given levels of Ql and Qh, solve the equilibrium. This entails solving the system of
equations (2), (3), (20), (21), (27), (28), (30) and (31) for wl, wh, Al, Ah, n, e, L, and H.
Parameters and Initial Conditions
Parameters are set equal to the following:   = 2,   = 0.7,   = 2,   = 1.1,   = 2,
k = 0.5, µ = 5,   = 0.1, x = 2. Many other parameterizations will produce qualitatively
similar results; the critical assumptions here are that   > 1 (the skilled- and unskilled-labor-
7Recent studies make a variety of related points which can also explain the demographic transition.
Hazan and Berdugo (2002) suggest that technological change at this stage of development increased the wage
di erential between parental labor and child labor, inducing parents to reduce the number of their children
and to further invest in their quality, stimulating human capital formation, a demographic transition, and
a shift to a state of sustained economic growth. In contrast, Doepke (2004) stresses the regulation of child
labor. Alternatively, the rise in the importance of human capital in the production process may have induced
industrialists to support laws that abolished child labor, inducing a reduction in child labor and stimulating
human capital formation and a demographic transition (Doepke and Zilibotti 2003; Galor and Moav 2006).
22intensive intermediates have enough substitutability to satisfy Proposition 1),8 0 < k < 1
(diminishing marginal returns to education), and µ > 1 (child-rearing costs convexly rise
with the number of children).9
We start with Ql = Qh = 0.1. For other initial conditions, we set n = 1 (replacement
fertility) and solve the 4 by 4 system of (2), (3), and the two ﬁrst-order conditions from
(25) for initial values of wl, wh, L and H. Given Ql = Qh and ensuring that wh/wl > 1, it
must be that L > H. By Proposition 1, this implies that the ﬁrst stage of the Industrial
Revolution must be unskilled in nature. To see this we turn to modeling the economy as it
evolves in time.
Dynamic Simulation
We simulate our hypothetical northwestern European economy through 30 time periods,
roughly accounting for the time period 1750-1910. The results are given in Figures 4–9,
using the parameterizations summarized above.10
Figure 4 illustrates the market for innovation. Initial Baconian knowledge B is set low
enough that the costs of innovation are larger than the beneﬁts in the beginning. As a result
technology levels remain stagnant at ﬁrst. But through Baconian knowledge growth costs
fall, ﬁrst catching up with the beneﬁts of research for technologies designed for unskilled
labor; hence, at t = 5 Ql begins to grow (that is,  l becomes positive). By contrast,  h < 0
early on, so Qh remains ﬁxed. Note that this results solely because L is larger than H
through Proposition 1. In other words, endowments dictate that the Industrial Revolution
will initially be unskilled-biased. As Ql rises the costs of subsequent unskilled innovation
rise because it gets increasingly more expensive to develop new technologies the further up
the quality ladder we go (due to the “ﬁshing-out” e ect from the   term); however, the
beneﬁts of research rise even faster due to both rising unskilled wages and unskilled labor
supplies (see equation 22). And further growth in Baconian knowledge keeps research costs
from rising too fast (see equation 15). As a result unskilled-intensive growth persists.
Skill-biased technologies, on the other hand, remain stagnant during this time. Their
eventual growth is however inevitable; Baconian knowledge growth drives down the costs to
8The degree of substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor has been much explored by labor
economists. Studies of contemporary labor markets in the U.S. (Katz and Murphy 1992, Peri 2004), Canada
(Murphy et al. 1998), Britain (Schmitt 1995), Sweden (Edin and Holmlund 1995), and the Netherlands
(Teulings 1992) suggest aggregate elasticities of substitution in the range of one to three. See Katz and
Autor (1999) for a detailed review of this literature.
9Other parameters simply scale variables (such as   and x) or a ect the speed of growth (such as  ,  
and  ). Changing the values of these parameters however would not shift the direction of technology, nor
would it a ect the responsiveness of households. Thus these speciﬁc values are not crucial for the qualitative
results and our underlying story.
10The initial level of B is chosen such that growth starts after a few periods.
23Figure 4: Incentives for Innovation in Each Sector
The ﬁgure shows the value of innovating and the cost of innovating in each period for each sector
in our simulated model. The economy is initially endowed with much more unskilled labor L than
skilled labor H. Hence, unskilled-intensive technologies are the ﬁrst to experience directed
technological change.























24develop them, and rising skilled wages (due to the growth of unskilled technologies) drives
up the value of developing them, as seen in equation (3).
By t = 12,  h becomes positive as well, allowing Qh to climb. At this point growth occurs
in both sectors, with advance in all periods given by the constant step size on the innovation
ladders. Note that this induces something of an endogenous demographic transition; fertility
rates stabilize and eventually begin to fall, while education rates rise, as we can see in Figures
5 and 6.
Figures 5 through 9 depict historical and simulated time series for fertility rates, education
rates, wages, skill premia and income per capita. As can be seen, our model reproduces the
early rise in fertility, followed by falling fertility and rising education. Education rates rise
very modestly during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, and accelerate only after
growth occurs in both sectors. To understand the fertility and education patterns depicted
in Figures 5 and 6, one must observe the absolute and relative wage patterns depicted in
Figures 7 and 8. The early stages of industrialization are associated with very limited wage
growth and a declining skill premium. This makes sense: what growth in applied knowledge
does occur is conﬁned to the unskilled sector.
The evolution of wages that this produces then has implications for education and
fertility—while the falling skill premium puts downward pressure on education (education
limits the children’s ability to earn unskilled income), rising wages overall put upward pres-
sure on education (since education becomes more a ordable).
These forces roughly cancel each other out, keeping any growth in education during this
period modest. Fertility however is free to rise: since slow-rising education keeps the resource
costs of each child low, parents can take advantage of rising unskilled wages by having more
children. Of course this produces more L and keeps H fairly low. Thus the model can
replicate the rapid fertility growth, low education growth, and falling skill premia observed
during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution.11
Once skill-biased technologies grow as well, the patterns of development change entirely.
Growth in both Al and Ah allows wages to rise more rapidly and keeps relative wages fairly
constant (from equation 24 we know that relative wages are a function of relative quality
indices and relative factor supplies—with balanced growth the former remain stable, leaving
only the latter to change the skill premium). In this case, the relatively stable skill premium
and rising overall wages changes behavior, as households lower their rates of fertility in order
11Acemoglu (2006) makes the distinction between “weak technological bias” (referring to how factor prices
change at given factor proportions) and “strong technological bias” (referring to how factor prices change
with changing factor proportions). Our modeling rests on the idea that early industrialization was strongly
unskilled labor biased: even with continuous injections of unskilled labor, quality-step increases in unskilled-
intensive technologies allowed relative returns to skilled labor to fall over time.
25Figure 5: Fertility Rates: Data versus Model
The ﬁgure shows the fertility levels in the English data and in the simulated model.
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Source: The data are 10-year moving averages from Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) and An-
dorka (1978).
26Figure 6: Education: Data versus Model
The ﬁgure shows the education levels in the English data and in the simulated model.
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Source: The data are 10-year moving averages from Flora et al. (1983).
27Figure 7: Wages: Data versus Model
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28Figure 8: Skill Premium: Data versus Model
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29Figure 9: GDP per Person: Data versus Model
The ﬁgure shows GDP per person in the U.K. data and in the simulated model.
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Source: The data are from Broadberry and van Leeuwen (2008) and Maddison (2003).
30to invest in education. The reason is that with overall wages rising, families can better
a ord the costs of greater education. And because the skill premium no longer falls with
technological growth, families no longer have the incentive to increase fertility. There is thus
an endogenous switch from child quantity to child quality. The demographic transition of
the mid to late 19th century is launched.
Figures 4 through 8 thus depict an integrated story of western European development
fairly consistent with the historical record. The theory of endogenous technical change can
indeed motivate a uniﬁed growth theory. Increases in income induce increases in education,
which then through the quality-quantity tradeo  eventually induce a fall in fertility. And
increases in H/L put downward pressure on the premium through supply-side forces. Thus,
as implied by (24), continued supply increases can keep pace with demand-side forces (Goldin
and Katz 2008): a modern economy can have both high relative skilled labor supplies and a
low skill premium even in the context of directed endogenous technological change.
Finally, Figure 9 shows the evolution of output per person in the data and the model.
In both theory and reality, the population growth spurred by initial technological growth
kept per capita income growth very modest (making the Industrial Revolution appear to
be a fairly un-revolutionary event). With technological advance occurring in more sectors,
incomes rose faster; this in turn provoked fertility decreases and made per capita growth
faster still.
3 Conclusion
We believe that by explicitly modeling research and development, thus endogenizing the
direction of technical change, we have been able to shed some valuable light on the transition
to modern economic growth. Like most uniﬁed growth models, our model is subject to
the criticism that it makes a take-o  “inevitable,” a proposition to which many historians,
more comfortable with notions of chance and contingency, might object. Our model makes
another claim, however, which seems much more robust: if a take-o  took place, it should,
inevitably, have ﬁrst involved unskilled-labor-using technologies, for the simple reason that
unskilled labor was the abundant factor of production at this time.
From this simple prediction, as we have seen, ﬂow a whole series of consequences. The
Industrial Revolution should have seen skill premia fall, which they did. It should therefore
have seen an initial increase in fertility rates, which again it did. Our model predicts that
these two phenomena would have continued to reinforce each other indeﬁnitely, barring some
countervailing force. One such force was the continuing growth in Baconian knowledge, which
would eventually lead to the growth of the science-based and skill-intensive sectors of the
31Second Industrial Revolution. While this should have caused skill premia to stop falling
and start rising, massive endogenous increases in education kept the relative wages of skilled
labor low.
Our simulations indicate that our model does a pretty good job of explaining the tran-
sition to modern growth during the eighteen and nineteenth centuries. Other theories often
rely on exogenous forces to reconcile falling skill premia with their accounts of the demo-
graphic transition. For example Galor and Moav (2006) highlight the fact that at precisely
this time European and North American governments embarked on a massive programme
of public education, thus exogenously raising skill endowments and lowering skill premia.
Furthermore, public primary education programmes were later followed by two world wars,
rising union strength, and public secondary and tertiary education programmes, all of which
served to further reduce skill premia, in the U.S. case at least through the “Great Compres-
sion” of the 1940s (Goldin and Margo 1992; Goldin and Katz 2008).
In the context of this paper, it seems possible that these so-called exogenous factors
leading to greater equality were actually endogenously inﬂuenced by growth, even though
powerful endogenous technological factors were pushing economies towards greater inequal-
ity. This is striking, since as Acemoglu (1998) points out, in the context of a model like
this one, long run exogenous increases in skill endowments lead to more rapid skill-biased
technical change, thus increasing the upward pressure on skill premia in the long run. What
is remarkable, therefore, is that western labor markets remained on an egalitarian path until
well into the twentieth century. In this context, current inegalitarian trends in the U.S. and
elsewhere can be seen as late nineteenth century chickens ﬁnally coming home to roost.
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36Appendix:
Limit Pricing and the Gains from Innovation
Here we solve for the price new innovators would charge for newly invented machines in the face of
competition from producers of older machines. First, let us describe the producers of the unskilled-
intensive good, AlL; analogous results will hold for the skill-intensive good. The production function
for these goods are  
1






Producers wish to maximize proﬁts or, equivalently, to minimize unit costs. The unit costs for
producers who buy new machines, denoted as uc, can be written as












where p(j) is the price of machine j and wl is the wage of L.
The question for us is, what maximum price could an innovator charge and drive out the
competition at the same time? The “competition” in this case are those who hold the blueprints of
the next highest-quality machines of quality Ql. The lowest price they can charge is their marginal
cost, Ql; if all old machine-producers charge this, unit costs can be written as











Traditional endogenous growth theories that use quality ladders typically have producers of
new machines charge a monopolistic mark-up over marginal cost. In our case producers of new
machines would charge a price pmonop =
 Ql
(1  ) for a machine of quality  Ql. However, in order for
this to be a proﬁtable strategy, unit costs for producers of AlL must be at least as low when they
buy new machines compared with when they buy the older, cheaper machines. In other words,
ucold   ucmonop, which requires that





















(1    )
 1  
.
This simpliﬁes to the condition     (1    )
  1
  . Thus, in order for monopoly pricing to prevail,
quality improvements must be large enough for goods-producers to be willing to pay the higher
price. If this condition does not hold, the monopoly-priced machine will be too expensive, and
producers will opt for the older machines.
However, producers of newer machines can charge a price lower than this and still turn a proﬁt.
How low would they have to go to secure the market? They certainly could go no lower than  Ql,
which is their own marginal cost of machine production. Fortunately they would not have to go
37that low; they could charge a price plimit low enough such that ucold   uclimit (see Barro and
Sala-i-Martin 2003 and Grossman and Helpman 1991 for similar limit-pricing treatments). That
is, producers of new machines could undercut their competition so that goods-producers would
prefer the higher-quality machines to the older lower-quality machines. And to maximize prices,
new machines producers would charge a price such that this held with equality:





















Solving for this limit price gives us
plimit =  
1
1  Ql >  Ql.
Thus, producers will always opt for newer machines, no matter the size of quality steps. So
our approach would be valid for any values of   > 1 and 0 <   < 1. Given our paramerization
described in section 2.3, we assume this limit pricing strategy is used.
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